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Thus we can see as an apparent result of the above discussed
decisions and the Lien Law mentioned by section, that if an owner
desires to improve property that has a large lien on it, or such a
lien that a mortgage company refuses to consolidate with its first
lien, unless he can get a subordination to such a building loan mort-
gage, which in the light of this decision, he will not get, then the
property will have to stay as it is, unimproved-thus achieving the
very thing that the brief of the arnicus curiae in the instant case
feared, but not from his point of view, that of danger to a title
or mortgage company investment, but rather from the viewpoint
of the holder of a first lien who wants to aid in improving the
property but fears the results of this case.
A subordination agreement is nothing more than a contract be-
tween the party giving and the party receiving, and the ordinary,
well established rules of contract should apply where a court of
equity is called upon to determine the issues raised between con-
testing parties.
SAMUEL A. LOCKER.
THE CONVERSION OF STOCK.
In a recent New York case 1 the plaintiff was awarded damages
to the full extent of the value of the stock for the conversion of an
unindorsed certificate. The case presents problems which are funda-
mental both in the law of conversion and in the law of corporate
stock.
By disregarding the doctrine: "In order that conversion of a cer-
tificate of stock may constitute a conversion of the stock, which it
represents, the owner must be thereby deprived of the stock, and not
merely of the certificate ;" 2 the Court of Appeals has ignored prec-
edent set in several other states.3 These irreconcilable decisions are
based on the theory that acquisition of use and title by the converter
is the test of conversion, and the rule that a certificate of stock is not
the stock or share itself, but mere evidence of the holder's rights as a
stockholder. 4 The latter is a logical deduction from the former
unsound premise.
The natural meaning of converting property to one's own use
has long since been left behind. Conversion, in the modern view,
manifests itself in the exercise of unlawful dominion over the plain-
Pierpoint v. Hoyt, 260 N. Y. 26, 182 N. E. 235 (1932).
'11 FLE rCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATION LAW (1932) §5114.
'Daggett v. Davis, 53 Mich. 35, 18 N. W. 548 (1884); Pardee v. Nelson,
59 Utah 497, 205 Pac. 332 (1922).
' Ibid.
NOTES AND COMMENT
tiff's personal property. 5 It is not essential that the tortfeasor have
actual physical possession of the chattel." That he assume control
over the property, by a possession, actual or constructive, which de-
prives the owner of his lawful dominion for any purpose, is sufficient. 7
While it is universally held that the stock certificate is mere evi-
dence of the holder's rights, it is to be noted that the better-considered
cases apply this principle solely to questions of title.8 There can be
no doubt of either the logic or the justice of that rule, when confined
to the aforementioned subject; but, since a share of stock is an
intangible essence incapable of physical possession or control, we
submit that the certificate is also the means by which the owner takes
his stock into constructive possession, the master switch through
which a corporate member's rights are controlled. For this reason it
can be seen that a conversion of the document deprives the true
owner of dominion and control of his stock and thus constitutes a
conversion of the stock itself.9
In Pierpoint v. Hoyt the majority opinion voices a similar view,10
the Court there says: "Wrongful acts affecting property rights in
corporate stock can ordinarily be committed only through the medium
of the certificates which evidence those rights. For the purpose of
redressing such wrongs the law must and does treat the symbol as
though it were the thing symbolized."
Such has always been the law in New York.'- It has often been
held, that a wilful and wrongful taking and disposal of indorsed stock
certificates is a conversion of the stock itself. 12  In Anderson v.
'Bristol v. Burt, 7 Johns. 254 (N. Y. 1810); Ball v. Liney, 48 N. Y. 6
(1871); Salt Springs Nat. Bank v. Wheeler, 48 N. Y. 492 (1872).
'Chambers v. Lewis, 28 N. Y. 454 (1864).
"Supra note 5.
'Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U. S. 365, 28 Sup. Ct. 512 (1908); Bigelow v.
Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U. S. 111, 32 Sup. Ct. 641(1912) ; U. S. Radiator Corp. v. State, 208 N. Y. 144, 101 N. E. 783 (1913) ;
Flour City Nat. Bank v. Shire, 88 App. Div. 401, 84 N. Y. Supp. 810 (4th
Dept. 1903), aff'd, 179 N. Y. 587, 72 N. E. 1141 (1904); Burke v. Steele, 43
N. Y. Supp. 346 (1896) ; Pacific Fruit Co. v. Coon, 107 Calif. 447, 40 Pac. 542
(1895); Cotter v. Butte & Ruby Valley Smelting Co., 31 Mont. 129, 77 Pac.
09 (1904) ; Morris v. Hussong Dyeing Machine Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 256, 86 Atl.
1026 (1908); Yeaman v. Galveston City Co., 106 Tex. 389, 167 S. W. 710
(1914).
'Supra notes 5 and 6.
"Supra note 1, at 29, 182 N. E. at 236.
"Anderson v. Nicholas, 28 N. Y. 600 (1863); Markham v. Jaudon, 41
N. Y. 235 (1869); Mahaney v. Walsh, 16 App. Div. 601, 44 N. Y. Supp. 969(4th Dept. 1897) ; Miller v. Miles, 58 App. Div. 103, 68 N. Y. Supp. 565 (1st
Dept. 1901), aff'd, 171 N. Y. 675 (1902). In Page v. Clark, 100 Misc. 395,
165 N. Y. Supp. 1058 (1917) the New York City Court held that a broker who
receives for sale, from a person not authorized to pass title, a stolen certificate
of stock upon which the name of the real owner has been forged and indorsed
is liable to him for the reasonable value of said stock represented by the cer-
tificate, at the time of its sale by the broker.
-Ibid.
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Nicholas,'3 speaking of the wrongful withholding of a stolen indorsed
certificate which had passed into the hands of a third party, the Court
remarked: "The stock sold and converted by the defendant, and the
avails of which he received, was indisputably the property of the
plaintiffs; the conversion by the defendant was distinctly found. The
defendant acquired no title thereto, by the delivery thereof to him
by the person who purloined the same from the plaintiffs, and he,
therefore, acquired no greater or better title to it than that possessed
from the person from whom he received it." Since the converter of
the stock did not obtain a good title, aside from statute,' 4 he could
pass no better title to an innocent purchaser than he himself had, even
if the document was indorsed in blank by the owner.' 5 It is to be
noted that notwithstanding the fact that neither the wrongdoer or
the purchaser could get beneficial use of the stock, nevertheless the
Court held that the conversion of the certificate deprived the owner
thereof of dominion and control of the property which it repre-
sented.' 6 On no other grounds can the decision be justified.
There is one seeming exception to the rule of conversion of stock
certificates. That is in the case of a pledgee, who will not be guilty of
conversion should he sell pledged certificates, provided that he has in
his possession, at all times during the term of the pledge, a certificate
or certificates equalling the number of shares pawned by the pledg-
ors. 1 7 This doctrine is based on the principle that: "One share of
stock does not differ from another share of the same capital stock.
Each is but an undivided interest in the corporate rights, privileges
and property." 18 Thus, the bailor is in no way injured, for by com-
plying with his contract, he may obtain from the bailee the identical
thing which he left with him. The principle is sound and any other
rule would place an unnecessary burden on those engaged in the
2' Id. at 603.
"The Uniform Stock Transfer Act, N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1913) §§162-
185, makes it possible for one who has stolen an indorsed certificate to give
unimpeachable title to an innocent purchaser for value. Turnbull v. Longacre
Bank, 249 N. Y. 159, 163 N. E. 135 (1928).
" Knox v. Eden Musee Co., 148 N. Y. 441, 42 N. E. 988 (1896) ; Hall v.
Wagner, 111 App. Div. 70, 97 N. Y. Supp. 570 (1st Dept. 1906); Kilmer v.
Hutton, 131 App. Div. 625, 116 N. Y. Supp. 127 (1909). Cf. McNeil v. Tenth
National Bank, 46 N. Y. 325 (1871); Merchants' Bank v. Livingston, 74 N. Y.
223 (1878); Brady v. Mount Morris Bank, 65 App. Div. 212, 73 N. Y. Supp.
532 (1st Dept. 1901) ; Talcott v. Standard Oil Co., 149 App. Div. 694, 134 N. Y.
Supp. 617 (1st Dept. 1912); Mitchell v. Boyer, 160 App. Div. 565, 145 N. Y.
Supp. 715 (1st Dept. 1914). Note (1902) 15 HA~v. L. REv. 403.
"Anderson v. Nicholas, su~pra note 11.
21 Horton v. Morgan, 19 N. Y. 70 (1859); Barclay v. Culver, 30 Hun 1
(N. Y. 1883) ; Caswell v. Putnam, 120 N. Y. 153, 24 N. E. 287 (1890) ; Hard-
ing v. Field, 1 App. Div. 391, 37 N. Y. Supp. 399 (1st Dept. 1896) ; Douglas v.
Carpenter, 17 App. Div. 329, 45 N. Y. Supp. 219 (1st Dept. 1897).
"3 CooK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) §485.
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pledging of stocks. The courts have followed a similar principle in
the grain elevator bailment cases.10
It seems that in the Pierpoint case 20 the opinion ignored one
very important element, which, if considered, would have appreciably
clarified the situation.21 While at common law the stock certificate
is of great importance, it is not essential to the transfer of title; but,
section one of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.22 adopted by the
legislature of the state, makes the transfer of the certificate the only
way of doing this. While this statute has not as yet been so inter-
preted by the New York courts, it seems certain that this would be
the view taken, for the framers of the Uniform Act have indicated
such to be the purpose of that section.23 Thus we can see that where,
aside from statute, it would be extremely difficult without a certificate
to dispose of stock, under the statute it would be impossible to pass
title. Certainly, one, who deprives a property owner of the power of
passing title, is guilty of conversion.
Undoubtedly some will hold that the awarding of damages to the
full extent of the value of the stock for the conversion of the unin-
dorsed certificate is unfair. Yet, this is the cry that has often arisen
in similar cases. 24 Nevertheless the courts, with few exceptions, have
steadfastly clung to the test of dominion and control for the tort,25
and the value of the property at the time of conversion as the measure
and damage.26  Certainly a person who has been deprived of his
"Andrews v. Richmond, 34 Hun 20 (N. Y. 1884); Ledyard v. Hibbard,
48 Mich. 421, 12 N. W. 637 (1882) ; St. Anthony & Dakota Elevator Co. v.
Dawson, 20 N. D. 18, 126 N. W. 1013 (1910).
Supra note 1.
= The certificate might, however, have been issued prior to the passing of
the uniform law in which situation the statute would not apply. N. Y. PERS.
PROP. LAW (1913) §184.
-N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1913) §162.
' Uniform Stock Transfer Act, §1,
"COMMISSIONERS' NOTE
The provisions of this section are in accordance with the existing
law (COOK, CORPORATIONS §373 et seq.) except that the transfer of the
certificate is here made to operate as a transfer of the shares, whereas at
common law it is the registry on the books of the company which makes
the complete transfer. The reason for the change is in order that the
certificate may, to the fullest extent possible, be the representative of the
shares. This is the fundamental purpose of the whole act, and is in
accordance with the mercantile usage. The transfer on the books of the
corporation becomes thus like the record of a deed of real estate under a
registry system."
2'G. L. Luther, A Test for Conversion (1908) 21 HAv. L. RFv. 408.
' Supra notes 5 and 6.
-"This is, of course, when the plaintiff waives the tort and sues in
assumpsit. A different rule of damages applies when the suit is in tort. Baker
v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211 (1873) ; Wright v. Bank of the Metropolis, 110 N. Y.
237, 18 N. E. 79 (1888). Cf. McIntyre v. Whitney, 139 App. Div. 557, 124
N. Y. Supp. 234 (1st Dept. 1910), aff'd, 201 N. Y. 526, 94 N. E. 1096 (1911).
But cf. Franklin Bank v. Harris, 77 Md. 423, 26 At1. 523 (1893) ; Continental
Mining Co. v. Bliley, 23 Colo. 160, 46 Pac. 633 (1896).
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certificate of stock, and thus of his only reasonable method of dis-
posing of his property in the open market, should be recompensed
for whatever harm he has suffered through the wrongdoer. Of
course if juries were gifted with a godlike intuition, it might be well
to adopt a rule, allowing the plaintiff damages for the depreciation of
the stock from the time he lost dominion until he regained control
(by the issuance of the new certificate), plus an award for whatever
additional inconvenience he suffered as a result of the defendant's
action. But we are living in a fallible age with jurymen whose opin-
ion as to the pecuniary value of trouble, arising from the same source,
might range from the infinitesimal to the infinite. Thus such a calcu-
lation might well work an injustice on either party to the action.
Moreover, in these troublous times of panic markets, it might be
extremely difficult to dispose of the new certificate, whereas at the
time of the conversion it might have been readily sold. In such case
we would be putting the burden on the person harmed rather than on
the wrongdoer. We think the fairer rule is the one adopted by the
courts that he who handles the property of another does so at his peril.
GEORGE F. L. HENTZ.
SET-OFF-RIGET OF DEPOSITOR-INDORSER IN INSOLVENT BANK.
The general rule followed by the great weight of authority is
that a depositor of an insolvent bank may set off his deposit therein
against a bona fide indebtedness of his own to the bank.' The fact
that the indebtedness of the depositor to the bank has not yet matured
at the time of insolvency does not interfere with this right of set-off.2
However, the question arises whether a depositor may set off against
a note upon which he is indorser his deposit in an insolvent bank,
where the solvency of the maker is conclusively proven.
That issue was raised in the recent case of Bank of United States
v. Braventan.3 There the defendant, indorser of a note held by the
'Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499, 13 Sup. Ct. 148 (1892) ; Yardley v.
Clothier, 49 Fed. 337, aff'd, 51 Fed. 506 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1892); Smith v.
Fenton, 43 N. Y. 419 (1871) ; Clute v. Warner, 8 App. Div. 40, 40 N. Y. Supp.
392 (3rd Dept. 1896); Van Wagoner v. Paterson Gas Light Co., 23 N. J. L.
283 (1852); Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., 88 Conn. 185, 90 Atl. 369
(1914) ; Upham v. Bramwell, 105 Ore. 597, 209 Pac. 100 (1922).
'Scott v. Armstrong, ibid.; Adams v. Spokane Drug Co., 57 Fed. 888
(E. C. D. Wash., E. D. 1892); Davis v. Industrial Mfg. Co., 114 N. C. 321,
19 S. E. 371 (1894). In Clute v. Warner, id., the Court said: "that while
the note was not due when the bank became insolvent, and its collection could
not be enforced before maturity, the plaintiff had the right to waive the addi-
tional time and elect to have it become due at that time, and to make payment
thereof by applying the amount of his money in the possession of the bank to
such payment."
-259 N. Y. 65, 181 N. E. 50 (1932).
